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COMMENT
REGIONAL RECIPROCAL BANKING LAWS:
CONSTITUTIONAL, BUT WHAT NEXT?
C. TIMOTHY GRAY
O N JUNE 10, 1985, the United States Supreme Court upheld
as constitutional the ever-increasing number of state laws that
establish regional reciprocal banking arrangements. In Northeast
Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem,1 the Court unanimously validated the Massachusetts and
Connecticut statutes that permit those states' bank holding com-
panies (BHC's) to be acquired by bank companies with their prin-
cipal places of business in reciprocating New England states. The
Court grounded its decision on a finding that regional reciprocal
banking arrangements are authorized by section 3(d) of the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956.2 In an opinion written by Justice
Rehnquist, the Court further concluded that state-imposed geo-
graphic restrictions on interstate bank company mergers do not vi-
olate the commerce, compact, or equal protection clauses of the
United States Constitution.'
The effects of the Northeast Bancorp decision will reach far be-
yond New England; it gives the states virtual carte blanche to au-
thorize interstate bank mergers that will significantly restructure
the nation's financial services industry. The purpose of this Com-
ment is to review the Supreme Court's analysis and decision in
Northeast Bancorp as well as the decision's impact on the move-
ment toward true nationwide interstate banking. The Comment
will conclude with a survey of potential federal and state legislative
actions to address the discriminatory and anticompetitive effects of
regional reciprocal banking.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF REGIONAL RECIPROCAL BANKING LAws
In recent years, many states have adopted statutes that permit
interstate bank company acquisitions by BHC's from states that
1. 105 S. Ct. 2545 (1985).
2. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 3, 70 Stat. 133, 134 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982)).
3. Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2556.
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grant comparable privileges." These laws are designed to allow
BHC's from outside the authorizing state, but within a defined ge-
ographic region, to purchase banks or bank holding companies
within the authorizing state. Typically, the reciprocity feature is
based on a requirement that the state in which the acquiring BHC
conducts the bulk of its business allow its bank companies and
banks to be purchased by BHC's from the authorizing state.5 Usu-
ally supplementing this requirement is a proviso that when the
bulk of a BHC's deposits no longer are located in the region de-
fined by the authorizing state's law, the out-of-state bank company
ceases to qualify as a regionally held BHC and must divest itself of
its banking operations in the state granting the reciprocal entry
privilege.' This provision is designed to prevent "leapfrogging," a
practice that would arise if the state in which the acquiring BHC
conducts its operations were to drop its regional restriction and al-
low in bank companies from outside the region.
Scholars have traced the policy basis for regional reciprocal in-
terstate banking to three reports that are not yet a decade old. In
1979 the Association of Bank Holding Companies, a trade group,
recommended allowing bank company mergers between contiguous
states.' Two years later, the Treasury Department recommended a
period of regional bank consolidation as a transitional step to full
nationwide interstate banking." Finally, in 1982, the Southern
4. See infra note 144.
5. See, e.g., Florida: FLA. STAT. § 658.295(3)(a) (1985); Massachusetts: MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 167A, § 2 (West 1984).
6. See, e.g., Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-553 (West Supp. 1985); Florida:
FLA. STAT. § 658.295(4)(b) (1985).
7. See Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Com., CS for HB 795 (1984) Staff Analysis 1 (final
May 22, 1984) (on file with the committee) [hereinafter cited as Commerce Comm. Staff
Analysis]. For example, Maine does not restrict acquisition of its BHC's to New England
region banks. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 1013 (Supp. 1985). If a Maine BHC were to
acquire a Connecticut BHC, and the Maine BHC were then acquired by a New York bank,
the resulting entity would be required to divest itself of its Connecticut banking operations
under that state's anti-leapfrogging provision. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-553 (West
Supp. 1985).
8. Simonson, Pringle & Cardwell, Regional Interstate Banking Developments, 10 OKLA.
CITY U.L. REV. 69, 76 (1985) (quoting GOLEMBE Assoc., INC., A STUDY OF INTERSTATE BANKING
BY BANK HOLDING COMPANIES (May 26, 1979) (prepared for the Association of Bank Holding
Companies)).
9. Wilmarth, The Case for the Validity of State Regional Banking Laws, 18 Loy. L.A.L.
REV. 1017, 1033 (1985) (quoting REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, DEP'T OF THE TREAS., GEOGRAPHIC
RESTRICTIONS ON COMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES 17-18 (Jan. 1981)). The con-
cept of regional reciprocal banking had its genesis in Florida during the 1970's, when there
was legislative consideration of an "Intersouth" banking arrangement. See Frieder, Legislat-
ing for Interstate Bank Expansion: Financial Deregulation and Public Policy, 9 J. CORP. L.
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Growth Policies Board, a planning group for twelve southern
states, urged its twelve member states to adopt regional reciprocal
legislation.'0 Underlying these reports was a sense of the inevitabil-
ity of full nationwide banking.
As the perception grew in the financial services industry that the
historic geographic restrictions on commercial banks would fall in
the near future, local bankers seized on the idea of regional recip-
rocal interstate banking." To the directors and officers of the na-
tion's more than ten thousand banks, the advent of nationwide in-
terstate banking would mean that large bank companies based in
the "money centers" of New York, Chicago, and California could
enter geographic markets that local bankers had long regarded as
geographically protected. Local bankers feared the money-center
banks would drain them of deposits, or growth in deposits, and
compete with them in the business of making commercial loans. In
many states, the defensive strategy chosen by local bankers was to
allow BHC's within their respective geographic regions to merge
assets and combine operations prior to the onset of full nationwide
interstate banking, allowing the resulting regional BHC's to be-
come large enough to compete with the money-center institu-
tions. 12 State policy-makers contended that regional banking com-
673, 676 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Florida Banking Study]. Professor Frieder's article is
an adaptation of a report entitled Interstate Bank Expansion: Market Forces and Competi-
tive Realities, which was prepared by the Florida Interstate Banking Study Group for the
Florida House of Representatives Committee on Commerce. It was the primary research
used in the legislative consideration of regional reciprocal banking in Florida. Id. at 673 n.*.
10. Florida Banking Study, supra note 9, at 696 n.123 (quoting SOUTHERN GROWTH POL-
ICIEs BOARD, REPORT OF THE REGIONAL BANKING COMMITEE To TH ExECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE SOUTHERN GROWTH POLICIES BOARD 9 (Nov. 1982)).
Significantly, the Southern Growth Policies Board report recommended that "reciprocal
banking agreements should be limited to the states of the Southern Growth Policies Board
region for a specified period of time with provisions for nationwide agreements beyond the
limiting period." Id. Florida and the other southeastern states ignored the latter part of this
recommendation-a "trigger" allowing all United States BHC's to enter the Southeast after
a transitional period. See infra text accompanying note 151.
11. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNOR OF FLORIDA TO
EXAMINE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR FLORIDA OF REGIONAL INTERSTATE BANKING 2 (Feb. 10, 1984)
[hereinafter cited as GOVERNOR'S BANKING REPORT].
12. An alternative rationale might be that the economic value of a resulting regional
BHC could be greater than the value of the BHC's as separate entities-that is, the whole
would be greater than the sum of the parts. If this theory were to hold, then the economic
benefit to shareholders of a regional BHC might be greater when full nationwide interstate
banking is established and money-center banks seek to acquire established networks of
banks. Cf. Commerce Comm. Staff Analysis, supra note 7, at 4 (regional reciprocal banking
would increase the value of shares of in-state BHC's, but they might be further increased by
nationwide interstate banking).
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panies would be more responsive to state economies than would
giant financial institutions headquartered on Wall Street.1"
II. THE Northeast Bancorp CASE
In 1982, Massachusetts became the first state to enact legislation
authorizing regional bank acquisitions with a reciprocity require-
ment.1 4 In 1983, Connecticut 15 and Rhode Island"6 passed similar
legislation. 17 The first regional reciprocal mergers in New England
were arranged soon after, presenting the test cases for regulatory
and judicial review of regional banking laws.
A. The Federal Reserve Board and the Second Circuit
After the passage of the regional reciprocal banking acts in Mas-
sachusetts and Connecticut, BHC's in those states began consoli-
dating. Three acquisitions initiated the consolidation of New Eng-
land BHC's.18 The surviving bank companies sought approval for
In any event, regional banking laws are having a profound effect. Prior to the Northeast
Bancorp decision, the largest BHC in the Southeast had 15 billion dollars in assets. One
year later, after a frenzy of mergers, the region's largest BHC has 24 billion dollars in assets.
Moreover, the largest BHC's in the Southeast are relatively stronger than many money-
center banks. NCNB Corp. and First Union Corp., both of Charlotte, N.C., have market
capitalization levels of 2.3 and 2.4 billion dollars respectively. BankAmerica Corp. of San
Francisco, Cal., and Chemical New York Corp. each have about 2.6 billion dollars in market
capitalization. One authority said, "What we have in a nutshell is that the biggest, strongest
banks no longer exist in New York." The transformation of banking, St. Petersburg Times,
July 14, 1986, at 10E, col. 1.
13. Florida Banking Study, supra note 9, at 696. "[Rjegional banking organizations
might tend to be more locally oriented with regard[] to their accommodation of middle mar-
ket firms and municipalities. There is no empirical evidence to support such a contention,
however." Id.
14. Ch. 626, § 4, 1982 Mass. Acts 1366, 1372 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167A,
§ 2 (West 1984)).
15. P.A. 83-411, §§ 2, 3, 1983 Conn. Acts 450, 451 (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §3
36-552 to -554 (West Supp. 1985)).
16. Ch. 201, § 1, 1983 R.I. Pub. Laws 363 (codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 19-30-1, -2
(Supp. 1985)).
17. In 1975, Maine became the first New England state to authorize out-of-state BHC's
to enter its banking market, effective in 1978. Ch. 500, § 1013, 1975 Me. Laws 1370, 1538
(codified as amended at ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 1013 (1980)). Later, Maine elimi-
nated its reciprocity requirement. Ch. 597, § 2, 1983 Me. Laws 24, 24 (codified at ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 1013 (Supp. 1985)).
18. Hartford National Corp., a Connecticut BHC, agreed to acquire Arltru Bancorpora-
tion, a Massachusetts BHC. Hartford Nat'l Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 353 (1984). Bank of
New England Corp., a Massachusetts BHC, agreed to merge with CBT Corp., a Connecticut
BHC. Bank of New England Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 374 (1984). Bank of Boston Corp., a
Massachusetts BHC, agreed to acquire Colonial Bancorp, Inc., a Connecticut BHC. Bank of
Boston Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 524 (1984).
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the acquisitions from the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System under the Bank Holding Company Act (the Act)."
Upon receipt of the applications, the Board invited comment. Cit-
icorp ' ° and Northeast Bancorp, Inc. filed comments opposing the
acquisitions.2 2
Citicorp and Northeast Bancorp challenged the Connecticut and
Massachusetts statutes as "unconstitutional under the provisions
of the Compact Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Com-
merce Clause of the United States Constitution." 3 The Board was
compelled by judicial decisions to decide the constitutional is-
sues,24 and it did so under a standard that it not hold a state stat-
ute to be unconstitutional unless there is "'clear and unequivocal
evidence of the inconsistency of the state law with the federal Con-
19. 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1982). In addition, Bank of Boston and Bank of New England
sought approval under § 1843(c)(8) because they also had agreed to acquire nonbanking
subsidiaries of the Connecticut bank companies. Bank of New England, 70 Fed. Res. Bull.
at 374; Bank of Boston, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 524.
20. Citicorp, a New York BHC, has been one of the most aggressive money-center banks
in seeking entry into states outside its principal place of business. See Wilmarth, supra note
9, at 1046 n.149.
21. Northeast Bancorp's subsidiary bank, Union Trust Co., joined its parent in pro-
testing the acquisitions. Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 740 F.2d 203, 204
(2d Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2545 (1985).
A Connecticut BHC, Northeast Bancorp agreed on Aug. 3, 1983, to merge with the Bank
of New York Co., a New York BHC. The merger was contingent upon the Connecticut stat-
ute being amended to allow full interstate banking or being found constitutionally defective
so that only the geographic restrictions on interstate mergers were excised. Northeast
Bancorp, Inc. v. Woolf, 576 F. Supp. 1225 (D. Conn. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 1439 (2d Cir.
1984). Northeast sought a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the Connecticut
law, based on many of the same grounds subsequently raised before the Federal Reserve
Board and in the federal courts. The case was dismissed because, among other things, the
district court determined that the only remedy would be to invalidate the entire statute,
which would not grant relief to Northeast. Therefore, Northeast did not have standing. Id.
at 1230. The Board subsequently denied Bank of New York's application to acquire North-
east because the combination was not permitted by Connecticut law. Bank of New York Co.,
70 Fed. Res. Bull. 527 (1984).
22. Hartford Nat'l, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 354 (Citicorp protesting Hartford National-
Arltru merger); Bank of New England, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 375 (Citicorp and Northeast
protesting Bank of New England-CBT merger); Bank of Boston, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 524
(Citicorp protesting Bank of Boston-Colonial merger).
23. Bank of New England, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 376 (footnotes omitted). The constitu-
tional and statutory issues in all three cases were identical; the Board most thoroughly dis-
cussed the issues in the Bank of New England order. Therefore, it will be the order princi-
pally cited in reviewing the Board's analysis.
24. Id. (citing Jefferson Parish v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411 (1965);
First State Bank v. Board of Governors, 553 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1977); Gravois Bank v. Board
of Governors, 478 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1973)).
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stitution.' ",25 Under this standard, and relying upon a detailed
staff analysis, 6 the Board concluded, "[W]hile the issue is not free
from doubt, there is no clear and unequivocal basis for a determi-
nation that [the Connecticut and Massachusetts statutes are] in-
consistent with the Commerce Clause, Compact Clause or Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. ' 27 It found
the state statutes authorized under the Douglas Amendment28 and
approved the acquisitions.29
As provided by the Act,30 Citicorp and Northeast Bancorp
sought judicial review of the Board's orders in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. They raised the same
constitutional objections, but the Second Circuit ruled against
them. They also argued "that the Massachusetts and Connecticut
statutes, to avoid conflicting with federal law, must either permit
all bank holding companies throughout the United States to ac-
quire their banks or permit none. '32 This argument was analyzed
and rejected in only two sentences. Having lost again, Citicorp and
Northeast Bancorp were granted review by the United States Su-
preme Court.3
25. Bank of New England, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 376 (quoting NCNB Corp., 68 Fed. Res.
Bull. 54, 56 (1982)).
26. Id. at 377 n.15. The staff analysis was published as an appendix to the order. Id. at
379-86 app. The Board cited to this analysis in both the Hartford National order, 70 Fed.
Res. Bull. at 354 & n.6, and the Bank of Boston order, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 524 & n.7.
27. Bank of New England, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 376-77 (footnote omitted).
28. Id. at 375. For an explication of the Board's legal analysis of the Douglas Amend-
ment issue, see id. at 383-86 app.
29. Hartford Nat'l, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 355; Bank of New England, 70 Fed. Res. Bull.
at 379; Bank of Boston, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 526.
Nevertheless, the Board expressed misgivings about the evolving policy toward interstate
banking limited to regions defined by the states, not the federal government.
[I]f the New England regional approach to interstate banking is emulated in other
parts of the country, there is a potential danger that the result could be to divide
the country into a number of banking regions. The Board believes that the public
policy issues that are raised by the regional approach are inherently national and
would be best resolved by Congressional action.
Bank of New England, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 379.
30. Under 12 U.S.C. § 1848, "any party aggrieved by an order of the Board ... [may]
obtain review of such order in the United States Court of Appeals within any circuit
wherein such party has its principal place of business or in the Court of Appeals in the
District of Columbia." Id.
31. Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 208-10. All appeals of the Board's orders were con-
solidated in this case. Id. at 206.
32. Id. at 208.
33. Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. 776 (1985) (mem.).
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B. The Supreme Court's Analysis
Before analyzing the constitutional issues raised by the three
New England regional bank company acquisitions, the Supreme
Court examined the federal statute that specifies the procedure to
be used by the Board for the review of proposed bank company
mergers and acquisitions. 4
1. The Douglas Amendment
The challenge to the regional reciprocal banking laws turned on
subsection (d) of 12 U.S.C section 1842, which is commonly re-
ferred to as the Douglas Amendment 5 because it was offered on
the Senate floor by Senator Paul Douglas.36 The Douglas Amend-
ment prohibits "any bank holding company or any subsidiary
thereof [from acquiring], directly or indirectly, any voting shares
of, interest in, or all or substantially all of the assets of any addi-
tional bank located outside the State in which operations of such
bank holding company's banking subsidiaries [are] principally con-
ducted." 7 An exception to this prohibition is made for cases in
which "the acquisition of such shares or assets of a State bank by
an out-of-State bank holding company is specifically authorized by
the statute laws of the State in which such bank is located, by lan-
guage to that effect and not merely by implication."s
The Court first asked whether the New England acquisitions
were consistent with the Douglas Amendment. 9 Indeed, the
Amendment presented a dilemma that Justice Rehnquist framed
succinctly:
It does not specifically indicate that a State may partially lift the
ban, for example in limited circumstances, for special types of ac-
quisitions, or for purchasers from a certain geographic region. On
the other hand, it also does not specifically indicate that a State
34. 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1982).
35. Bank of New England, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 385 app. (staff analysis discussing legis-
lative history of Douglas Amendment).
36. Dem., Ill., 1949-67.
37. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
38. Id.
39. Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2550. By framing the issue in this manner, the
Court sought to separate it from the argument that, under the commerce clause, the Doug-
las Amendment was insufficient authorization by the Congress for the states to enact terri-
torially discriminatory economic legislation. Id.; see infra notes 84-98 and accompanying
text.
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is allowed only two alternatives: leave the federal ban in place or
lift it completely.4
To discern the effect of the Douglas Amendment, the court turned
to the legislative history of the Act.
The principal purpose of the Act, the Court concluded, was to
restrict BHC's from "purchas[ing] banks in different localities
both within and without a State, and thereby provide the
equivalent of branch banking" 41 without violating the restrictions
of the McFadden Act.42 The separate bills to regulate BHC's
passed by each house of the Congress contained divergent provi-
sions on BHC's acquiring banks or bank companies outside their
home states. The House proposed a total ban while the Senate
Banking Committee would have permitted interstate acquisitions
subject only to approval by the Federal Reserve Board. 3 The
Douglas Amendment was "a compromise between the two ex-
tremes" that also protected each state's right to allow interstate
acquisitions."
Because the Douglas Amendment was born in the heat of Senate
debate, there were no committee reports or other materials to show
Congress' intent. Consequently, the Senate floor debate was the
only legislative history available to the Court to assist it in con-
struing the Douglas Amendment.4 The crux of the debate was
Senator Douglas' comparison of the restrictions on BHC acquisi-
tions that would be imposed by his Amendment with those that
the McFadden Act imposed on branching by national banks." In a
passage that later drew the Court's attention, Senator Douglas ex-
plained that "our amendment will permit out-of-State holding
40. Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2551.
41. Id.
42. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982). The McFadden Act was enacted by Congress in 1927 in part to
prohibit national banks from branching nationwide. Act of Feb. 25, 1927, ch. 191, § 7, 44
Stat. 1224, 1228 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982)). It was amended in 1933 to
allow national banks to branch within a state to the same extent as state-chartered banks.
Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 23, 48 Stat. 162, 189 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36
(1982)).
43. Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2551.
44. Id. at 2552.
45. Id. at 2551. The Court accorded the statements of Senator Douglas "substantial
weight" regarding the meaning of the legislation because no other "authoritative indicators
of legislative intent" existed regarding the Douglas Amendment. Id. However, the Federal
Reserve Board's staff analysis suggested that, at least for some issues, the Senate debate
excerpts might be "too fragmentary and unspecific to show congressional intent." Bank of
New England, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 385 app.
46. 102 CONG. REc. 6858 (1956).
BANKING LAWS
companies to acquire banks in other States only to the degree that
State laws expressly permit them to."'4 7 He described his proposal
as being consistent with the McFadden Act's purpose of prevent-
ing the expansion of national banks within a state or across state
lines "in a way contrary to State policy."48
The Court closely examined the McFadden Act analogy. It re-
viewed an earlier decision that had weighed the McFadden Act's
restrictions on branch banking49 and concluded that "[t]he McFad-
den Act did not offer the States an all-or-nothing choice. '50 The
Court then noted that, at the time the Bank Holding Company Act
was passed, some states limited branching to specific locales in-
stead of allowing it statewide.5 Reasoning by analogy, the Court
then decided "there can be no other conclusion but that Congress
contemplated that some States might partially lift the ban on in-
terstate banking without opening themselves up to interstate
banking from everywhere in the Nation. ' 52 Thus, the Court re-
jected Citicorp and Northeast Bancorp's argument that Senator
Douglas' phrase "only to the degree that State laws expressly per-
mit them" was intended "merely as a quantitative reference to the
number of States which might lift the ban, and did not mean that
a State could partially lift the ban. '53
The Court not only found the Massachusetts and Connecticut
statutes "consistent with the Douglas Amendment's anticipation
of differing approaches to interstate banking, '5 4 it also found that
the two states' regional reciprocal banking statutes were consistent
with the more general congressional goal of maintaining local con-
trol over banking.55 The Court suggested that these states were
concerned with the competition that local banks and geographi-
cally restricted BHC's were receiving from nonbank financial insti-
47. Id. (statement of Sen. Douglas), quoted in Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2552
(emphasis added).
48. 102 CONG. REc. 6860 (1956), quoted in Bank of New England, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at
385 & n.32 app.
49. Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2552 (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank &
Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 258 (1966)).
50. Id.
51. Id. The Court quoted Senator Douglas regarding geographic restrictions on intra-
state branching in 1956: "In New York the State is divided into 10 zones. Branch banking is
permitted within each of the zones, but a bank cannot have branches in another zone." Id.
at 2552-53 (quoting 102 CONG. REc. 6858 (1956)).
52. Id. at 2553 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 2552.
54. Id. at 2553 (emphasis added).
55. Id.
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tutions not limited by state lines.56 If that was the motivation for
the Connecticut and Massachusetts laws, then unlimited entry by
out-of-state BHC's would only have exacerbated the problem.
Therefore, the states adopted an approach that was intended to
allow the development of regional BHC's, which are perceived as
more locally oriented, before they must compete against large
money-center banking organizations.5 7 An additional justification
was that the regional approach would allow a local assessment "'of
the benefits and detriments that might result from a broader pro-
gram of interstate banking.' "58 Taking these factors into account,
the Court concluded that "Connecticut's approach is precisely
what was contemplated by Congress when it adopted the Douglas
Amendment.""9
The Court's analysis and conclusion on this issue-that there
could be "no other conclusion" but that Congress "precisely con-
templated" discriminatory interstate banking laws 60-is curious
and troubling. Except for Senator Douglas' account of how one
state structured its intrastate branching practices,"1 the Amend-
ment's meager legislative history contains no express reference to
the concept of regional interstate banking.6 2 Indeed, the Amend-
ment's purpose easily could have been otherwise; it may have been
offered primarily to appease those who felt a total ban on inter-
state BHC acquisitions would be offensive to states' rights. 3 Alter-
natively, given that no state at that time allowed interstate acqui-
sitions, 4 a more plausible objective would have been to reinforce
the interstate merger prohibition that was the principal goal of the
legislation. 5 Although most commentators agree that the Douglas
Amendment gives states the authority to admit out-of-state
BHC's, "[n]owhere did the discussion touch upon the specific issue
of regionalism, or even upon the broader issue of the fashion in
56. Id.; see infra notes 154-78 and accompanying text.
57. Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2553 (quoting REPORT TO GEN. ASSEMBLY OF THE
STATE OF CONNECTICUT (Jan. 5, 1983)).
58. Id.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. "Contemplate" means "[t]o view or consider with continued attention; to regard
thoughtfully; to have in view as contingent or probable as an end or intention." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 288 (5th ed. 1979).
61. 102 CONG. REc. 6858 (1956) (statement of Sen. Douglas).
62. Id. at 6050-63.
63. Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2552; Florida Banking Study, supra note 9, at 742.
64. 102 CONG. REC. 6060 (1956) (statements of Sens. Douglas and Bennett).
65. See Note, Regional Banking Laws: An Analysis of Constitutionality Under the
Commerce Clause, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 548, 559 (1985).
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which states might choose to exercise their power under the
Amendment."'6
This lack of certainty about the intent and scope of the Douglas
Amendment, at least in the context of regional interstate banking,
has been authoritatively acknowledged. When considering the
same issue, the Federal Reserve Board was anything but certain.
Two views were expressed. The Amendment could have been writ-
ten to give the states plenary power to admit out-of-state BHC's
on an individual, deal-by-deal basis . 7 On the other hand, an argu-
ment can be made that the Amendment's legislative history is too
sketchy to support a conclusion that Congress intended to author-
ize a discriminatory practice otherwise contrary to the commerce
clause.68 This latter argument is highly significant because the
Court requires "explicit and clear authorization of discrimination
[in interstate commerce] by the Congress because of the funda-
mental implications of such discrimination for the federal union."69
Instead of relying exclusively on a brief legislative history, the
Court could have buttressed its conclusion by relying on other au-
thority. While the issues of the Douglas Amendment presented in
Northeast Bancorp were ones of first impression for the Supreme
Court, a similar question had been decided earlier in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
In Iowa Independent Bankers v. Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System,"° an association of more than four hundred
Iowa banks challenged two bank purchases by a Minnesota BHC
and the 1972 Iowa statute that authorized the acquisitions.7 ' The
Iowa bankers argued, as Citicorp and Northeast Bancorp did in
challenging the New England laws, that the Douglas Amendment
limited states to deciding only "whether to extend the right to ac-
quire in-state banks to all out-of-state bank holding companies or
66. Golembe & Kumin, Regional Interstate Banking Compacts: IIl-Conceived and Un-
constitutional Anomalies, 18 LOYOLA L.A.L. REv. 993, 998 (1985); see also Florida Banking
Study, supra note 9, at 742 ("The specific question of whether the states might permissibly
discriminate on the basis of bank holding company location, however, appears not to have
been considered."); Note, supra note 65, at 558-59.
67. Bank of New England Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 374, 385 app. (1984) (staff analysis of
Douglas Amendment).
68. Id.; see also Iowa Indep. Bankers v. Board of Governors, 511 F.2d 1288, 1296 (D.C.
Cir.) ("Not once in the entire debate [over the Douglas Amendment] is the discrimination
question raised."), cert. denied mem., 423 U.S. 875 (1975).
69. Bank of New England Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 385 app.
70. 511 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied mem., 423 U.S. 875 (1975).
71. Id. at 1292 (citing IOWA CODE ANN. § 524.1805 (West Supp. 1974-75)).
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to prohibit such acquisitions. '72 Reviewing the Amendment's legis-
lative history, the court noted that "Senator Douglas seem[ed] to
anticipate that states might be selective in allowing bank holding
companies to cross state lines. 73 The court concluded that the
Douglas Amendment was structured to allow states to condition
entry by out-of-state BHC's in a way that would not contravene
state policy.74 Moreover, the court found that the narrow all-or-
nothing interpretation urged by the Iowa bankers was at odds with
another provision of the Act, which provision specifically preserved
to the states all regulatory rights they had before the enactment. 75
In reviewing the New England statutes, the Federal Reserve
Board employed Iowa Independent Bankers as support for a gen-
eral argument that states, under the Douglas Amendment, may se-
lectively admit out-of-state BHC's to achieve specific state poli-
cies.7e Indeed, as the Board noted, several states have permitted
out-of-state BHC's to enter their markets under narrowly drawn
conditions. These conditions have included "limitations on activi-
ties, number of offices and home office location, 7 7 which do not
apply to in-state BHC's. These conditions have restricted the gen-
eral operations of out-of-state BHC's, but permitted specific opera-
tions such as credit card services. States have employed this strat-
egy in attempting to entice out-of-state BHC's to relocate specific
services in order to avoid more stringent home-state restrictions on
interest rates and insurance powers, to allow acquisitions of finan-
cially troubled banks,7 s and to "grandfather" BHC's already in the
state when preventing further entry.7 9 These limited-entry statutes
72. Id. at 1296.
73. Id. Eight years later, the District of Columbia Circuit revisited the Douglas Amend-
ment and reaffirmed the conclusions reached in Iowa Independent Bankers. Conference of
State Bank Examiners v. Conover, 715 F.2d 604, 612, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied
mem., 466 U.S. 927 (1984).
74. Iowa Independent Bankers, 511 F.2d at 1297.
75. Id. at 1296 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1982)). However, the Supreme Court said in
Northeast Bancorp that, without the specific authorization it found in the Douglas Amend-
ment, the dormant commerce clause would preclude regional banking laws that discrimi-
nated among the states. Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2553-54. Therefore, this leg of the
court's analysis in Iowa Independent Bankers-which is missing from the Supreme Court's
discussion-is suspect.
76. Bank of New England, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 385-86 app.
77. Id. at 386 app.
78. See id.; see also Florida Banking Study, supra note 4, at 688-89; Wilmarth, supra
note 9, at 1038-39.
79. Bank of New England, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 385 app. Florida law prohibits out-of-
state BHC's from acquiring Florida banks, but it "grandfathered" foreign BHC's owning
banks or trust companies in the state as of 1972. FLA. STAT. § 658.29(3) (1985). Prior to the
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reflect that "[b]etween the extremes of authorizing only specific ac-
quisitions and erecting no barriers to acquisition at all lies a wide
range of intermediate legislative approaches.""0 Significantly, how-
ever, these statutes are not-at least facially-geographically dis-
criminatory and "might be viewed as imposing substantially less of
a burden on commerce"'8 than regional reciprocal banking laws. If
the Supreme Court had concluded that the Douglas Amendment
permitted the states only an "on and off switch"8 " for interstate
acquisitions, the validity of these limited-purpose statutes would
have been brought into question.83
While the Supreme Court chose not even to mention what lim-
ited secondary authority existed supporting restrictive approaches
to out-of-state BHC acquisitions, its holding plainly validates re-
gional reciprocal banking laws under any likely scheme that might
be presented. This conclusion follows logically from the Court's di-
vining what no one else had discerned-that regional reciprocal
banking laws were "precisely contemplated" by Congress when it
passed the Act in 1956.
2. The Commerce Clause
The Court's conclusion about the clarity of the congressional in-
tent behind the Douglas Amendment may have been fashioned
partly to ease the Court's analysis of the claim based on the com-
merce clause.84 Citicorp and Northeast Bancorp argued that the
Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes erected barriers that were
contrary to the commerce clause's primary goal-to eliminate
trade barriers between the states and prevent "precisely this type
advent of regional reciprocal banking, NCNB Corp., a North Carolina BHC, exploited this
provision to become one of the largest bank companies in Florida, giving it a three-year
head start over its regional competitors. Taylor, After the Takeovers, Bank Colonizing Be-
gins in Earnest, FLA. TREND, Feb. 1986, at 57-59. For a thorough review of this provision
and how a few out-of-state bank companies used it for early entry to the lucrative Florida
market, see Dunlap, Interstate Banking Developments in Florida: Pushing Through Legal
Barriers and Toward a Level Playing Field, 9 NOVA L.J. 1, 2-11 (1984).
80. Florida Banking Study, supra note 9, at 742.
81. Bank of New England, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 386 app.
82. Id.
83. Ironically, Citicorp has been a major beneficiary of these limited-purpose bank stat-
utes. See Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 1046 n.149.
84. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes."). The
Court deliberately segregated its analysis of the Douglas Amendment from the commerce
clause even though the two issues were inextricably related. See supra note 39.
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of economic 'Balkanization' [of the nation] into a confederation of
States to the detriment of the welfare of the Union as a whole."
8 5
The Court said that, without the Douglas Amendment granting
to the states the power to specify the conditions for entry by out-
of-state BHC's into their banking markets, the "dormant Com-
merce Clause would prohibit a group of states from establishing"
regional reciprocal banking schemes,8 6 and that individual states
lacked independent power to regulate out-of-state BHC acquisi-
tions .8  However, the Court concluded that the commerce clause
was not dormant, but had been affirmatively employed in the
Douglas Amendment, granting to Massachusetts and Connecticut
the authority to enact regulatory legislation discriminating on a ge-
ographic basis. 8 The Court determined that Congress had "plainly
authorize[d]" these state laws, making them "invulnerable to con-
stitutional attack under the Commerce Clause. '8 9 Although the
Court sought to segregate the commerce clause arguments from the
Douglas Amendment issue, its brusque dismissal of the commerce
clause issue can only be based on its view of the Douglas Amend-
ment's legislative history as showing "plain authorization" for re-
gional reciprocal banking laws.
Surprisingly, the Court's summary analysis and treatment of the
commerce clause arguments lacks the exacting scrutiny it has em-
ployed when dealing with other economic legislation that discrimi-
nated on the basis of geographic location. The Court has required
that the congressional authorization for protectionist legislation
"be 'expressly' or 'explicitly' or 'specifically' stated in federal
law."90 In New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire,91 the Court
85. Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2553 (citations omitted); cf. P. Volcker, Statement
by Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, before
the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 24,
1985), reprinted in Statements to Congress, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 430, 434 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as Interstate Banking Testimony].
86. Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2553-54.
87. Id. at 2554.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Bank of New England, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 384 app. (citing White v. Massachusetts
Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 213 (1983) (state regulation "specifically au-
thorized by Congress .. .not subject to the Commerce Clause even if it interferes with
interstate commerce"); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 340-41
(1982) (Federal Power Act did not expressly state congressional intent to sustain state laws
contravening commerce clause); Western and Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equali-
zation, 451 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1981) ("Congress explicitly intended" McCarran-Ferguson Act
to restore states' plenary authority over insurance industry).
91. 455 U.S. 331 (1982).
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adopted an analysis that stands in vivid contrast to its handling of
the Douglas Amendment in Northeast Bancorp. At issue in New
England Power Co. was a federal statute that reserved to the
states the "authority now exercised over exportation of hydroelec-
tric energy which is transmitted across a State line. '92 At the time
Congress enacted the provision, New Hampshire required state ap-
proval for the exportation of hydroelectric energy.93 The Court
held that the federal statute did not sufficiently "evince a Congres-
sional intent 'to alter the limits of state power otherwise imposed
by the Commerce Clause.'"" If a similarly rigorous analysis had
been applied to the Douglas Amendment, it would have been diffi-
cult to find sufficient congressional authorization to overcome the
burdens that the regional reciprocal banking statutes place on in-
terstate commerce.
Under the "stringent test of explicitness laid down by the Su-
preme Court," there is nothing in the text of the Douglas Amend-
ment to authorize the economic Balkanization created by regional
reciprocal banking laws.e5 Any authorization must be found
through the use of extrinsic aids." To find in the Douglas Amend-
ment's "sparse legislative history"97 that the regional reciprocal
banking laws are clearly authorized stretches the meaning of ex-
press authorization. Considering that favoritism of one region over
another has never been judicially evaluated within the context of
the commerce clause,"8 a more thorough analysis by the Court of
the effect that regional banking arrangements have on interstate
commerce would have been welcome. Unfortunately, such an anal-
ysis was not forthcoming, and Northeast Bancorp settles the con-
stitutional discussion under the commerce clause of regional recip-
rocal banking statutes.
92. Federal Power Act of 1935, ch. 687, § 201(b), 49 Stat. 803, 847 (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (1982)).
93. New England Power Corp., 455 U.S. at 335.
94. Id. at 341.
95. Bank of New England, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 384 app. Indeed, the analysis for the
Federal Reserve Board concluded that "the Douglas Amendment does not appear on its
face to authorize discrimination" by New England states against BHC's from outside the
region. Id. (emphasis in original). See also Golembe & Kumin, supra note 66, at 997.
96. Bank of New England, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 384 app.
97. Golembe & Kumin, supra note 66, at 998.
98. Bank of New England, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 384 app.
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3. The Compact Clause
Citicorp and Northeast Bancorp also attacked the Connecticut
and Massachusetts statutes as violative of the compact clause,
which provides: "No state shall, without the Consent of the Con-
gress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State . . . ."99 A determination of whether an agreement among
states is within the scope of the compact clause, and thus requires
congressional approval, encompasses a dual analysis. First, the ex-
istence of a compact or an agreement amounting to a compact
must be found. Second, the agreement or compact must tend to
increase the political power of the compacting states in a manner
that diminishes federal supremacy. 00
The Court began the first step of its compact clause analysis by
noting the similarity of the four New England statutes, and that
the passage of the four New England statutes resulted from a co-
operative effort.101 However, the Court attached more importance
to the absence of "several of the classic indicia of a compact."'' 0
The Court observed that there was no requirement for a state to
pass the legislation in any particular form, and the statutes did not
mandate that the reciprocal legislation in the state of the acquiring
BHC contain the same regional restriction. After pointing out that
Maine's legislation did not include a regional restriction and that
Rhode Island's regional restriction would terminate soon,'03 the
Court decided that a true compact did not exist. It based this con-
clusion on the fact that not all states participating in the asserted
compact limited entry rights for out-of-state bank companies to
BHC's based in the New England region. 10 4 While probably not
crucial to the compact clause inquiry in light of the second part of
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
100. Bank of New England, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 380 app.; see also United States Steel
Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978); New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S.
363 (1976).
101. Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2554.
102. Id.
103. Id.; see Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 1013 (Supp. 1985); Rhode Island:
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-30-1(c) (Supp. 1985). The Court said Rhode Island would drop its re-
gional restriction in 1986, Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2554, however, the current
Rhode Island statute mandates that the regional restriction not be dropped until July 1,
1987. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-30-1(c) (Supp. 1985).
104. Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2554. The Court's analysis was flawed by consid-
ering Rhode Island and Maine statutes in determining whether there was a compact. These
states' statutes were not before the Court. Simply because BHC's from Massachusetts and
Connecticut could acquire bank companies from Rhode Island and Maine does not mean
those states sought to become part of a New England bank zone of indefinite duration. In
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the Court's analysis, this finding was at odds with the conclusion of
the Federal Reserve Board and the Second Circuit. Both concluded
that the New England regional reciprocal banking statutes were
most likely, in the Board's words, an "implicit compact or agree-
ment that has never been approved or authorized by Congress." '
The Court then conducted what it has deemed to be the more
important aspect of the compact clause analysis-an inquiry into
the impact of an agreement on federal supremacy."' It reaffirmed
the doctrine that only those agreements designed to increase the
political power of the states, and which might encumber federal
supremacy, would fail under the compact clause.10 7 In determining
the impact of the regional reciprocal banking statutes on federal
supremacy, the Court found that the Douglas Amendment was an
abrogation of federal supremacy in this area and immunized the
regional banking statutes from attack as unconstitutional com-
pacts. 08 The Court concluded that aspects of the statutes that
might conflict with other federal statutes, such as the provision
that allows out-of-state BHC's to rescue financially troubled
banks, would be preempted and render a compact clause argument
"academic."'' 09 The Court also summarily rejected the contention
that the regional reciprocal banking laws would interfere with the
sovereignty of states outside New England." 0 It concluded that the
statutes would in no way enhance the political power of the partic-
ipating states or adversely affect the federal structure."'
fact, their renunciation of continuing regional restrictions exemplifies policies greatly differ-
ent from those of Massachusetts and Connecticut.
105. Northeast Bancorp, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 380 app.; see also Northeast Bancorp, Inc.
v. Board of Governors, 740 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2545 (1985);
Golembe & Kumin, supra note 66, at 999.
Strangely, the Court did not even acknowledge its previous conclusion that "[aigreements
effected through reciprocal legislation may present opportunities for enhancement of state
power at the expense of the federal supremacy similar to the threats inherent in a more
formalized 'compact.'" United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452,
470 (1978) (footnote omitted).
106. United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 471 (1978).
107. Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2554 (citing New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S.
363, 369 (1976)).
108. See id.
109. Id. at 2554-55. Federal law allows BHC's to acquire banks outside their home states
when the target banks are in financial distress under Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. su-
pervision. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(f) (1982).
110. Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2555.
111. Id. (quoting United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 471
(1978)).
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The Court may well be correct in its conclusions, however, its
cursory analysis fails to recognize the reason that major political
battles have been fought over the control of the nation's banking
structure throughout American history." 2 Many of these battles
were initiated by those wanting to wrest power from national
banks and place it in local state-regulated banks-and, by doing
so, assert the rights of the states as against those of the central
government.118 The Supreme Court has acted as the final arbiter in
these disputes since McCulloch v. Maryland."4 For the Court to
overlook the role that banking plays in the economy-and the at-
tendant political power that accrues to the states by virtue of the
economic influence they gain from control over financial institu-
tions-ignores the very purpose of the regional banking acts.
Among other things, these statutes are intended to foster the
growth of regional bank companies that will be more entrenched as
competitors of the national banking companies, and more respon-
sive to local political and economic forces. As regional bank compa-
nies are constructed, the increased financial power they will create
should redound to the benefit of the participating states, or at least
the states where the regional bank companies will be based. The
enhanced economic power of those states in turn may be translated
into increased political power within the federal system. This pros-
pect escaped the Court's attention.
4. Equal Protection
The last line of constitutional attack on the regional reciprocal
banking laws was founded on the equal protection clause. 115 The
argument focused on the facial discrimination in the statutes,
which limited potential acquiring BHC's to those whose principal
place of business was located in New England. 6 Citicorp and
Northeast Bancorp had abandoned this argument in their original
briefs filed with the Court, 1 7 apparently conceding the deference
the Court grants state legislatures when economic regulations are
112. For a concise overview of the historic role of banking issues in federal-state rela-
tions, see Golembe & Kumin, supra note 66, at 999-1005.
113. Id.
114. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
115. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
116. Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2555.
117. Id.
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challenged on equal protection grounds.11 8 However, they revived
this argument after the Court's decision, earlier in the 1985 Term,
in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward. 1 9
In Metropolitan Life, the Court held unconstitutional an Ala-
bama statute that levied a gross premiums tax on foreign insurance
companies at a rate higher than that imposed on domestic insur-
ance companies.120 The Court reaffirmed the rule that "the Equal
Protection Clause imposes limits upon a State's power to condition
the right of a foreign corporation to do business within its bor-
ders."12 ' The standard by which the Court judged Alabama's au-
thority to impose discriminatory taxes was that
whatever the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign cor-
porations from doing business within its boundaries, that author-
ity does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on domestic
corporations, unless the discrimination between foreign and do-
mestic corporations bears a rational relation to a legitimate state
purpose."'2
Applying this lenient rational relationship test, the Court rejected
Alabama's differential gross premiums tax because it was based on
illegitimate state purposes-encouraging the formation of new do-
mestic insurers and the investment in Alabama assets and state
government securities.1 2 3 The Court considered the discriminatory
burdens on nonresident insurers to be "the very sort of parochial
discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to
prevent.' 24 Indeed, it concluded that accepting Alabama's conten-
tion, that promoting local industry is a legitimate purpose under
the equal protection clause, would emasculate that provision.12 5
Plainly, the discriminatory Massachusetts and Connecticut bank-
118. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 105 S. Ct. 1676, 1683 (1985) (rational
relationship necessary to sustain discriminatory economic legislation "not difficult to
establish").
119. 105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985) (5-4 decision).
120. Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 1684.
121. Id. at 1680.
122. Id. (quoting Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451
U.S. 648, 667-68 (1981) (emphasis added)).
123. Id. at 1683-84. The foreign companies received a credit for investments in Alabama
but could never receive treatment equal to domestic insurance companies, which paid taxes
at a preferred rate regardless of their investments in the state. Id. at 1684.
124. Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 1681-82.
125. Id. at 1683.
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ing statutes were more onerous than the Alabama tax law at issue
in Metropolitan Life; they did not simply impose more rigorous
standards for entry into the Massachusetts and Connecticut mar-
kets by nonresident corporations, they completely excluded many
bank companies altogether. Nevertheless, the Court distinguished
away the case, 26 although not persuasively.
The first difference the Court articulated was that the regional
banking statutes did not favor domestic BHC's over out-of-state
BHC's. 12 7 Rather, the statutes discriminated against BHC's from
outside the designated region. This reasoning was based on a "dis-
tinction without a difference." 28 The discrimination against out-
of-state corporations was of the same kind as in Metropolitan Life,
if not of the same degree. In both cases, the discriminatory treat-
ment of the out-of-state concerns was based exclusively on their
place of domicile.
The second difference the Court perceived was the legitimacy of
the purposes behind the statutes. A "legitimate state purpose" is
the initial step in determining the constitutionality of a statute
under the equal protection clause.1 2' The purposes the Court saw
behind the Connecticut and Massachusetts statutes were "to pre-
serve a close relationship between those in the community who
need credit and those who provide credit," and to protect the "in-
dependence of local banking institutions.' 30 After a brief discus-
sion, the Court concluded that these motivations were different
from those in Metropolitan Life.1 31
The Court concluded these purposes were legitimate by implying
that the states have a greater interest in local control of banking
than they do with respect to insurance companies.1 32 The Court
found support for this proposition in an observation it had made in
an earlier case, Lewis v. B.T. Investment Managers, Inc., 33 that
"both as a matter of history and as a matter of present commercial
reality, banking and related financial activities are of profound lo-
126. Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2555 (citing Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 1684
n.10).
127. Id.
128. Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 1684.
129. E.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); see also Note, Re-
gional Banking Statutes and the Equal Protection Clause, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 2025, 2032
(1984).
130. Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2555.
131. Id. at 2556.
132. See id. at 2555-56.
133. 447 U.S. 27 (1980).
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cal concern."134 That case focused on a Florida statute that prohib-
ited out-of-state BHC's from conducting investment advisory ser-
vices in Florida. 35 The Court held that the statute was
unconstitutional because, despite the historic local concern with
banking, it impermissibly burdened interstate commerce in a dis-
criminatory fashion.3 6 Thus, no matter how venerated this policy,
constitutional principles were held to limit the states in seeking to
achieve it.
The Court's unquestioning acceptance of local control of banking
as a legitimate state purpose is perplexing in light of its rejection
of a similar argument in B.T. Investment Managers.137 There, the
Court suggested that this asserted justification for a discriminatory
policy could easily mask an improper motive. As a skeptical but
diplomatic Court put it: "[W]e doubt that the interest itself is en-
tirely clear of any tinge of local parochialism. '" 138 Moreover, the
Court found the Florida statute did not even serve its purported
purpose because out-of-state ownership of Florida BHC's was not
prohibited. Thus, the Court concluded that "the State's interest in
local control, to the extent it legitimately exists, has [not] been sig-
nificantly or evenhandedly advanced" by the Florida statute.'39
Admittedly, the Court's determination in B.T. Investment Man-
agers that this purpose was illegitimate took place within the con-
text of a commerce clause analysis. 40 However, as the Court
demonstrated in Metropolitan Life, the legitimacy of a state pur-
pose under the equal protection clause may be determined by anal-
ogy to commerce clause analysis."4 In any event, the Court offered
no explanation of how the New England states' interests would be
realized evenhandedly in Northeast Bancorp when Florida's inter-
ests were not advanced evenhandedly in B.T. Investment Manag-
ers."'42 The Court simply concluded that the motivations for the
134. B.T. Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. at 38, quoted in part in Northeast Bancorp, 105 S.
Ct. at 2555.
135. FLA. STAT. § 659.141(1) (1973).
136. B.T. Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. at 43-44.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 35.
141. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 1684. For a comparison of these two
modes of analysis, see id. at 1681 n.6.
142. Plainly, they were not. Local control of a state's banks logically could not be ad-
vanced in any significant way by letting its BHC's buy bank companies in other states, and
it certainly could not be advanced by letting out-of-state banks buy local BHC's. Even if
this interest were advanced, it was hardly done so in an evenhanded manner; the statutes
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Massachusetts and Connecticut regional reciprocal banking stat-
utes were different and nobler than those for the Alabama statute
in Metropolitan Life. Had the Court looked behind the asserted
purpose of local control in Northeast Bancorp, it might well have
concluded that "local control" really meant keeping big New York
banks out of New England states while creating expansion oppor-
tunities for their own BHC's."43 Characterized in this manner, the
Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes should have been invali-
dated on equal protection grounds.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF Northeast Bancorp FOR THE STATES
At least one-third of the states have enacted regional banking
statutes that do not provide for entry from states outside their re-
gions at any time."4' Virtually all of them require reciprocity. In
addition, at least six other states have passed regional reciprocal
banking acts with a "trigger" that opens those states to nationwide
facially discriminated in favor of New England banks whose states had reciprocal laws and
against those from all other states.
143. Note, supra note 129, at 2035. One commentator suggests that the success or failure
of an equal protection challenge to a statute can hinge on whether the Court characterizes
the statute as being discriminatory in purpose or in means. Id. at 2032. This commentator
analogizes the local control purpose supporting regional reciprocal banking statutes to the
past contributions rationale asserted in Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982). In Zobel,
Alaska sought to distribute surplus state funds derived from oil revenues to residents based
on the duration of their residency. The state argued that long-time residents deserved re-
wards for their past contributions to Alaska. Four Justices concluded that the past contribu-
tions rationale was really unfounded favoritism for long-time residents, and thus an illegiti-
mate state purpose, unsupportable on an equal protection challenge. Note, supra note 129,
at 2035 (citing Zobel, 457 U.S. at 70-71 (Brennan, J., concurring)). The commentator further
suggests that the equal protection clause contains a federalism component which prevents a
state from discriminating against other states in the federation. Id. at 2036 (citing Allied
Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring)). This commentator
concludes that because regional reciprocal banking statutes patently discriminate against
nonresidents, i.e., BHC's from outside the region, they violate the equal protection clause.
Id. at 2043.
144. Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-552 to -554 (West Supp. 1985); Dis-
trict of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 26-801 to -809 (Supp. 1986); Florida: FLA. STAT. §
658.295 (1985); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-1-620 to -625 (Supp. 1985); Idaho: IDAHO
CODE §§ 26-2601 to -2612 (Supp. 1985); Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, § 2510 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1986); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-15-1 to -28 (Burns 1986 Repl.); Maryland:
MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1001 to -1007 (Supp. 1985); Massachusetts: MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 167A, §§ 1-3 (West 1984); Minnesota: Ch. 339, 1986 Minn. Sess. Law Serv.
66 (West) (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 48); Missouri: Act of Apr. 30, 1986, 1986 Mo.
Legis. Serv. 122 (Vernon) (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 362.910, .925); North Caro-
lina: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-209 to -218 (Supp. 1984); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 715.065
(1985); South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 34-24-10 to -100 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985);
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 45-12-101 to -108 (Supp. 1985); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. §
7-1-702 (Supp. 1985); Virginia: VA. CODE § 6.1-398 to -407 (Supp. 1985).
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reciprocal banking at some future date. " 5 For states that have
adopted these regional banking laws, the implication of Northeast
Bancorp is that their statutes are constitutional.
The Florida law is typical of these statutes. In 1984, Florida
joined the first wave of southeastern states to authorize regional
reciprocal bank mergers. 146 In its most important respects, the
Florida statute is best seen as a refinement of the Connecticut and
Massachusetts statutes upheld in Northeast Bancorp.147 It re-
quires that regional BHC's owning Florida banks have at least
148 theighty percent of their deposits in the region, where the Massa-
chusetts and Connecticut laws only require that the BHC's have
their principal places of business in New England, or not be owned
by an out-of-region BHC, either directly or indirectly.19 Moreover,
the Florida statute follows the Connecticut law in requiring that an
out-of-state BHC which acquires a domestic institution divest it-
self of in-state bank operations once it fails to qualify as a regional
BHC.150 The differences between the Florida and the Connecticut
and Massachusetts statutes are merely in form, not substance. The
145. Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. § 287.900 (Supp. 1984) (contiguous states until July 13,
1986); Michigan: MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 487.430b (West Supp. 1986) (regional until Oct.
10, 1988); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 666.225-.385 (1985) (regional except California until
Dec. 31, 1988); New Jersey: Ch. 5, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 19 (West) (to be codified at
N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 17:9A-370 to -372) (regional and national triggers based upon reciprocity
in other states); Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1101.5 (Page Supp. 1985) (regional until Oct.
17, 1988); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 19-30-1 to -13 (Supp. 1985) (regional until July
1, 1987).
New Jersey has the most cumbersome trigger. Under that state's interstate banking
law-which was made contingent upon passage of separate legislation-New Jersey BHC's
could be acquired by bank companies from a 15-state Central Atlantic region when any
three states in the region, each of which has twenty billion dollars in commercial bank de-
posits, offer reciprocity to New Jersey BHC's. In addition, New Jersey would offer nation-
wide reciprocity when any 13 states, including four of the 10 largest by total commercial
bank deposits, allow in New Jersey BHC's. Ch. 5, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 19 (West).
146. Regional Reciprocal Banking Act of 1984, ch. 84-42, 1984 Fla. Laws 96 (principal
provisions codified at FLA. STAT. § 658.295 (1985)). For a detailed analysis of the Florida
regional reciprocal banking law, see Loumiet & Crim, Florida's Regional Reciprocal Bank-
ing Act of 1984, 14 STETSON L. REV. 1 (1984).
147. Compare Florida: FLA. STAT. § 658.295 (1985) with Connecticut: CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 36-552 to -554 (West Supp. 1985) and Massachusetts: MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 167A, §§ 1-3 (West 1984).
148. FLA. STAT. § 658.295(2)(h),(l) (1985).
149. See Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167A, § 2 (West 1984); Connecti-
cut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-552(j) (West Supp. 1985).
150. Florida: FLA. STAT. § 658.295(4)(b) (1985); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§
36-553, -554 (West Supp. 1985); cf. Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 167A, § l(f)
(West 1984) (banking commissioner may further define "successor" bank to prevent evasion
of statute's purpose).
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purpose of the statutes is to allow the regional consolidation of
BHC's, and to continue to exclude money-center banks from the
states' growing commercial markets.
This comparison is significant because the Florida statute is the
one after which other states in the Southeast have patterned their
regional reciprocal banking laws."5' In style and form, they are
from the same mold. Substantively, the statutes are pure regional
reciprocal banking laws, generally requiring that eighty percent of
each regional BHC's deposits be located in the region, and man-
dating divestment if the out-of-state acquiring BHC no longer
qualifies as a regional BHC. Still, there are differences. For one
thing, the states do not agree on which of their sister states are
located in the region. 52 For another, they do not agree on how long
a domestic bank should be in business before it is eligible for take-
over by a regional BHC.153 These differences, however, belie the
remarkable uniformity of purpose and design. The decision in
Northeast Bancorp means all are constitutional.
IV. THE MOVEMENT TOWARD NATIONAL INTERSTATE BANKING
Although regional reciprocal banking laws now have been vali-
dated by the Supreme Court, the debate over them will not end. In
fact, it may just be beginning. These laws, varying as they do from
state to state, will soon be the principal barrier to nationwide fi-
nancial services as the nation continues to drift toward true inter-
state banking.
151. Compare Florida: FLA. STAT. § 658.295 (1985) with Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-
1-620 to -625 (Supp. 1985); Maryland: MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1001 to -1007 (Supp.
1985) (limited to contiguous states until 1987, then to 14 states and the District of Colum-
bia); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-209 to -218 (Supp. 1984); South Carolina:
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 34-24-10 to -100 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); Tennessee: TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 45-12-101 to -108 (1985); and Virginia: VA. CODE §§ 6.1-398 to -407 (Supp. 1985).
152. Florida excludes Kentucky. FLA. STAT. § 658.295(2)(j) (1985). Georgia excludes Ma-
ryland, GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-620(10) (Supp. 1985), but Maryland includes Georgia after July
1, 1987. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 5-1001(o) (Supp. 1985).
153. Florida: FLA. STAT. § 658.295(3)(a)(3) (1985) (two years); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN.
§ 7-1-621(d)(2) (Supp. 1985) (five years); Maryland: MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 5-1003(a)
(Supp. 1985) (de novo entry or bank in existence for four years); North Carolina: N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 53-211(a) (Supp. 1985) (five years); South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-24-
50(b) (Supp. 1984) (five years); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-12-103(4) (Supp. 1985)
(five years); Virginia: VA. CODE § 6.1-399(3) (Supp. 1985) (two years).
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A. The Reality of Nonbank Banks
The expressed purpose behind the regional reciprocal banking
concept is to allow smaller bank holding companies the opportu-
nity to consolidate prior to the advent of national interstate bank-
ing.154 However, most of the states that have enacted regional re-
ciprocal banking legislation have not defined this interim period by
adopting a trigger that would authorize nationwide reciprocity in
the future.155 Only six states have enacted regional reciprocal
banking laws with a trigger for nationwide reciprocity. 151 If the re-
gional reciprocal banking statutes were designed as a transitional
step between a state-limited banking structure and nationwide in-
terstate banking, then they have not been cast to attain that goal
because they do not specify when the transition will end. Certainly,
the time has come to determine the duration of this interim
period.
The reality of the marketplace may be that interstate banking
already has come about in everything but name, without regard
to-or possibly in spite of-regional reciprocal banking laws. A
scholarly study undertaken for the Florida House of Representa-
tives in 1984 noted that if banking is defined as the provision of
financial services, then interstate banking has already arrived."5 7
One of the principal ways that BHC's have avoided the Douglas
154. Florida Banking Study, supra note 9, at 696 n.123 (citing SOUTHERN GROWTH POLI-
CIES BOARD, REPORT OF THE SOUTHERN REGIONAL BANKING COMMITTEE TO THE EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE OF THE SOUTHERN GROWTH POLICIES BOARD 9 (Nov. 14, 1982)); Dunlap, supra
note 79, at 12-13; Interstate Bill Becomes Law in Florida, American Banker, May 24, 1984,
at 1, col. 4.; Regional Interstate Banking Bill Nears Approval in Florida, American Banker,
May 16, 1984, at 23, col 3.
155. For example, Florida rejected a trigger when considering regional reciprocal bank-
ing legislation in 1984. FLA. H.R. JouR 214 (Reg. Sess. 1984) (Amendment 1 to Fla. CS for
HB 795 (1984)) (laying on the table proposed Dec. 31, 1986, trigger); FLA. S. JouR 215, 250
(Reg. Sess. 1984) (Amendment 3 to Fla. CS for HB 795 (1984)) (defeating proposed phase-in
of nationwide reciprocity over three years). Another trigger proposal was rejected in 1985.
FLA. S. JOUR. 406 (Reg. Sess. 1985) (Amendment 3 to Fla. HB 1321 (1985)) (defeating pro-
posed July 1, 1989, trigger).
156. See supra note 145. In addition, two states have provided for nationwide reciproc-
ity. New York: N.Y. BANKING LAW § 142-b (Consol. Supp. 1984); Washington: WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 30.04.230 (1986). Four states have open-entry banking laws with no reci-
procity required by an acquiring BHC's home state. Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 06.05.235
(Supp. 1985); Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-321 to -327 (Supp. 1985) (open entry
effective Oct. 1, 1986, with de novo charters available in 1992); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9-B, § 1013 (Supp. 1985); Oklahoma: Ch. 155, § 4, 1986 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 439, 448
(West) (to be codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, § 506) (effective July 1, 1987).
157. Florida Banking Study, supra note 9, at 697-706; see also Cohen, Interstate Bank-
ing: Myth and Reality, 18 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 965 (1985).
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Amendment's geographic restrictions on expansion of commercial
banking has been through the use of so-called "nonbank banks."
Section 4(c)(8) of the Act 158 was drawn so that BHC's may provide
financial services in another state as long as a subsidiary does not
both offer commercial loans and accept demand deposits, that is,
checking accounts. 159 By separating the taking of demand deposits
and the making of commercial loans between different subsidiaries,
BHC's have been able to circumvent the federal and state barriers
to interstate expansion. Out-of-state BHC's have been aggressive
in exploiting this legal quirk, and nowhere has the result been
more apparent than in Florida. Florida has the second-largest
number of nonbank subsidiary offices in the country,160 and the
greatest proportion-eighty-five percent-operated by out-of-state
BHC's.a1
Out-of-state BHC's are establishing their presence in Florida al-
most to the point of conducting full-scale banking operations. The
Federal Reserve Board has allowed out-of-state BHC's to establish
Florida subsidiaries that take demand deposits and make con-
sumer, but not commercial, loans."6 2 In some instances, these com-
panies had previously established a commercial lending presence in
158. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 4(c)(8), 70 Stat. 133, 135 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982)).
159. Florida Banking Study, supra note 9, at 699. This loophole arises because of the
definition of bank in the Act. "'Bank' means any institution.., which (1) accepts deposits
that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and (2) engages in the business
of making commercial loans." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982) (emphasis added).
160. Florida Banking Study, supra note 9, at 702. See also Interstate Banking Testi-
mony, supra note 85, at 431 (Chairman Volcker noting Florida was the target of approxi-
mately 20% of the nonbank bank applications by BHC's).
161. This figure is derived by comparing the number of nonbank subsidiary offices oper-
ated by local BHC's and the total number of interstate nonbank subsidiary offices in the
state. See Whitehead, Interstate Banking: Probability or Reality?, EcON. REv. Mar. 1985, at
6, 11 (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta) (comparing maps 3 and 4). As of January 1985,
more applications were pending for the establishment of nonbank banks in Florida than in
any other state. Id. at 16.
162. See, e.g., Bankers Trust New York Corp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 51 (1985) (approving
application for New York BHC subsidiary in Palm Beach, Fla., to offer time and demand
deposits and make consumer loans); Bank of Boston Corp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 55 (1985)
(approving application for Massachusetts BHC subsidiaries in Sarasota and Deerfield
Beach, Fla., to offer time and demand deposits and make consumer loans).
The critical decision in this wave of nonbank bank applications came in U.S. Trust Corp.,
70 Fed. Res. Bull. 371 (1984). After that decision, "virtually all of the nation's largest bank
holding companies . . . filed applications for hundreds of nonbank banks to be located na-
tionwide." This development "effect[ed] fundamental changes in the structure of banking in
this country by weakening if not altogether eliminating . . . the restrictions on interstate
banking." Bankers Trust New York Corp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. at 54 (dissenting statement of
Gov. Wallich).
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the state 6 3 in addition to trust and investment advisory services."
To abide by at least the letter of the law, the Federal Reserve
Board has required the out-of-state BHC's to refrain from the in-
tegration of checking account and consumer lending with their
commercial lending.16 5 The Florida Comptroller and the Florida
Bankers Association have opposed these applications, contending
that the out-of-state BHC's commercial lending activities would be
conducted in an integrated fashion with the consumer banking ser-
vices. 6' The Board has accepted the out-of-state BHC's assurances
that they will not integrate their services.167
The Board's approval of these interstate banking services-the
offering of demand deposits, consumer lending, and commercial
loans in the same state, albeit through different subsidiar-
ies-illustrates just how far down the road to interstate banking
the nation has traveled.
B. The Catalyst: The Dimension Financial Decision
The financial services industry has undertaken this journey de-
spite the misgivings of the Federal Reserve Board.168 The Board
has tried but failed to halt this process. For purposes of determin-
ing which institutions would be banks regulated by the Board
under the Bank Holding Company Act, the Board attempted to
amend Regulation Y to provide for a broader definition of banks.
Under that proposal, "banks" would be those institutions which
accepted deposits that were "as a matter of practice" payable on
demand,1 69 and made what the Board considered "commercial
loans" by means of conventional or alternative instruments.170 The
163. E.g., Bankers Trust New York Corp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. at 52. Significantly, U.S.
Trust Corp. did not engage in commercial lending in Florida prior to approval of its 1984
nonbank bank application. Id.
164. E.g., id. at 51.
165. E.g., id.
166. E.g., id. at 52. For a detailed account of the U.S. Trust Corp. case and its after-
math, see Taylor, Why Nonbanks Strike Fear In The Hearts of Florida Bankers, FLA.
TREND, Dec. 1984, at 74. Despite their proliferation, nonbank banks are considered a poor
substitute for conventional banking operations. Id. at 76 (expert explaining nonbank banks
are "longest, most tedious and expensive way to get into banking" and are not popular with
consumers).
167. E.g., Bankers Trust New York Corp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. at 53.
168. U.S. Trust Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 373 (trend toward nonbank banks threatens
"possibly dangerous alteration of the banking structure without Congressional action on the
underlying policy issues").
169. Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(a)(1)(A) (1985).
170. Id. at § 225.2(a)(1)(B).
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purpose of this measure was to regulate as banks those financial
entities "offering the functional equivalent of traditional banking
services. '17' Such an expansive definition of "bank" would have re-
stricted commercial enterprises not engaged in banking from offer-
ing these financial services across state lines. Furthermore, it
would have effectively blocked interstate banking by BHC's which
have exploited the nonbank bank loophole. 72
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit invali-
dated the rule change shortly after it was adopted in 1984.173 Re-
cently, the Supreme Court affirmed that decision in Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System v. Dimension Financial
Corp.17' The Court concluded that Congress intended the term
"commercial loans" to embrace only direct loans, not "commercial
loan substitutes."I1M Further, it struck down the Board's broadened
definition of "demand deposits," which was crafted to include Ne-
gotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW) accounts. 17 The Court said
the duty to change the definition of a bank for purposes of regula-
tion under the Bank Holding Company Act rests with Congress,
and that the Board could not "correct flaws that it perceives in the
statute it is empowered to administer.' 17 7 One effect of Dimension
Financial will be to allow BHC's to conduct virtually all tradi-
tional banking services by offering NOW accounts 17 8 and commer-
cial loans, or by offering traditional demand deposits along with
commercial loan substitutes. Unless Congress acts, the expansion
of interstate banking services through the proliferation of nonbank
banks seems certain to continue.
171. Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 106 S. Ct. 681, 683 (1986), aff'g 744
F.2d 1402 (10th Cir. 1984).
172. For an extended discussion of the Board's concerns over the proliferation of non-
bank banks, see P. Volcker, Statement by Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, before Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision,
Regulation and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S.
House of Representatives (Apr. 17, 1985), reprinted in Statements to Congress, 71 Fed.
Res. Bull. 424, 425 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Nonbank Bank Testimony].
173. 744 F.2d 1402 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986).
174. 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986).
175. Dimension Financial, 106 S. Ct. at 686-87.
176. Id. at 686.
177. Id. at 689.
178. Id. at 685 ("A NOW account functions like a traditional checking account .
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C. The Board's Solution: Regional Banking With a Trigger
In dealing with the nonbank bank issue Congress will also be
forced to deal with the interstate banking issue because the two
are "inextricably related.' 1 79 The link between the nonbank bank
issue and interstate banking stems from the fact that BHC's are
forced to compete with nondepository businesses-retail chains
like Sears, Roebuck & Co., for example-that offer bank-like ser-
vices, and thrift institutions which are not prohibited from inter-
state branching. 80 Additionally, BHC's want to expand into re-
gions with rapidly growing economies.'"' These market forces have
prompted the BHC's to undertake interstate expansion by what
Chairman Volcker has described as the "'unnatural' channel" of
nonbank banks.8 2 Because "the status quo is hardly satisfac-
tory,"'' 3 the Board has suggested congressional action to deal with
the interstate banking issue. The approach suggested by the Board
is to allow states to construct regional reciprocal banking arrange-
ments and then be required after a few years to permit entry by
BHC's from any state that offers reciprocal rights.
The Board's proposal to allow limited regional reciprocity with a
federally mandated national trigger would ameliorate the weak-
nesses and unfairness of the regional arrangements. Principal
among these shortcomings is what Chairman Volcker has described
as the alignment of regions "without clear and objective rationale"
other than to exclude money-center banks.'8 Such arrangements
might result in combinations of banks long distances and many
states apart without allowing banking between contiguous states or
in metropolitan areas divided by state lines. "Viewed as a perma-
nent arrangement, regional compacts would tend to balkanize
banking, with a tendency toward regional concentrations.' ' 8  A
179. Interstate Banking Testimony, supra note 85, reprinted in 71 Fed. Res. Bull. at
430.
180. Id., reprinted in 71 Fed. Res. Bull. at 431.
181. Id. Some money-center banks are entering new territories by buying failing banks
and thrifts. Chase Manhattan Corp., a New York BHC, recently acquired Park Bank of St.
Petersburg, Fla., in an auction by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. State law imposed an
18-month moratorium on expansion beyond the bank's home county. Chase Plots Its Flor-
ida Strategy, FLA. TREND, Apr. 1986, at 79. Citicorp took over Biscayne Federal Savings and
Loan of Miami, Fla., in a similar deal in 1983. Id.
182. Interstate Banking Testimony, supra note 85, reprinted in 71 Fed. Res. Bull. at
434.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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time limitation on the regional arrangements would allow the ex-
press purpose of regional reciprocal banking statutes to be ful-
filled-that is, it would allow smaller BHC's to consolidate to com-
pete with money-center banks-and yet ensure the eventual
benefits of national interstate banking. Furthermore, it would re-
serve to each state the decision whether to allow outside BHC's to
enter its market; however, once a state chose to allow entry, it
could not limit entry based on geographic discrimination beyond
the trigger date."'
D. The Congressional Response: Cautious Steps
National legislation would most effectively create uniform condi-
tions throughout the American economy, but so far Congress has
not acted definitively. Representative St. Germain, Chairman of
the House Banking Committee, has proposed legislation to sanc-
tion regional interstate banking arrangements for a limited pe-
riod. 187 The bill provides that each state could enact reciprocal in-
terstate banking laws, either nationwide or regional, but by 1990 or
two years after a state enacted an authorizing statute, whichever
was later, that state's geographic restrictions on entry would
end. 188
The bill also contains several provisions suggested by the Fed-
eral Reserve Board as part of a transition to full interstate bank-
ing. In order to maintain the nation's dual banking system,189
Chairman Volcker has suggested that interstate expansion be
"confined to separately incorporated and chartered components of
a holding company.''190 This procedure would allow each state to
maintain its authority over a BHC operating within its borders.
The House proposal would prohibit interstate branching of banks
unless the branches were already in place.1 9' Thus, if a BHC
wished to expand nationwide, it would be forced to do so through
the acquisition of existing banks or by chartering de novo banks.
186. Id.
187. H.R. 2707, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1985).
188. Id. The proposal excluded several kinds of special purpose banks, insolvent banks,
and "grandfathered" banks. Id.
189. This term means that the banking industry is regulated by both national and state
regulatory agencies. See Interstate Banking Testimony, supra note 85, reprinted in 71 Fed.
Res. Bull. at 433.
190. Id.
191. H.R. 2707, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1985).
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Another concern addressed in the House bill is the prevention of
excessive concentration of financial resources in BHC's as they ex-
pand nationwide. The concentration of bank deposits and assets in
a few large, money-center banks has been raised frequently as an
argument against nationwide interstate banking. 92 Although the
evidence of the extent of concentration likely to occur is not con-
clusive,'9 3 "it is quite likely that interstate banking will signifi-
cantly increase the concentration of banking resources at the na-
tional level."' 94 However, there is little evidence to support the
assertion that nationwide interstate banking would result in con-
centration of banking resources at the local level.' 95
The House bill includes several measures to prevent excessive
concentration through interstate bank mergers. On the national
level, the measure would: (1) grant the Federal Reserve Board au-
thority to reject any merger that would result in an "undue con-
centration" of banking resources within the nation, a region, or a
state; (2) prevent any of the nation's twenty-five largest BHC's
from merging with one another; and (3) prohibit any merger in
which the resulting BHC would control more than one percent of
the nation's banking deposits. 19 Further, each state would be enti-
tled to limit the percentage of deposits or assets that any BHC
could hold so long as any such restriction applied equally to all
banking organizations, whether domestic or foreign. 9"
E. State Responses: Pulling the Trigger
The House Banking Committee has favorably reported the St.
Germain proposal, but the prospects for congressional approval
any time soon are bleak. Thus, while congressional action may be
the only way uniformly to address interstate banking-because the
combined pressures of that issue and the nonbank bank issue focus
192. E.g., Interstate Banking Testimony, supra note 85, reprinted in 70 Fed. Res. Bull.
at 432; see also Rhoades, Concentration in Local and National Markets, ECON. REV., Mar.
1985, at 28 (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta); Florida Banking Study, supra note 9, at 693.
193. Interstate Banking Testimony, supra note 85, reprinted in 71 Fed. Res. Bull. at
432; Rhoades, supra note 192, at 28-29.
194. Rhoades, supra note 192, at 29. While the fear of banking concentration at the
national level is raised as an argument against nationwide interstate banking, little has been
said about concentration of regional banking resources. But see Florida Banking Study,
supra note 9, at 693 (regional banking may lead to "increased concentration of resources
and economic power in these regions").
195. Rhoades, supra note 192, at 29-30.
196. H.R. 2707, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1985).
197. Id.
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there-the possibility of action by the states should not be
dismissed.
The central issue in each state will be the same as in Congress:
De facto interstate banking already exists,"'8 so how can its full
benefits be brought to the public? Many scholars agree the status
quo in most interstate banking jurisdictions-indefinite regional
reciprocal banking-is not in the public interest.19 9 In fact, the
literature suggests that, over the long term, national interstate
banking would offer the most benefits to consumers through more
competitive interest rates for borrowers and savers, more product
lines, and greater access to capital for burgeoning businesses. 00
The only reasonable rationale advanced for regional reciprocal
banking was to give state-limited banks a transition period in
which to grow large enough to compete with money-center
banks. 01 Now that regional reciprocal banking laws are in place in
most parts of the country-and with any questions about the con-
stitutionality of these transitional arrangements having been re-
solved by the Northeast Bancorp decision-the regional mergers
are taking place rapidly.20 2 State policy-makers should now take
the next step and set dates to end all geographic restrictions on
entry.
Reaching a resolution of this contentious issue will not be easy.
Florida's experience illustrates the policy impasse that can develop
from the conflict between the views of self-interested money-center
banks on the one hand and self-interested local bankers on the
other. Since regional reciprocal banking was first contemplated in
Florida, the adoption of a trigger for nationwide reciprocity has
198. See supra notes 154-67 and accompanying text.
199. See Florida Banking Study, supra note 9, at 757-58; Golembe & Kumin, supra note
66, at 1008-15; D. Savage, Regional Interstate Banking-Better Than the Alternatives? 1
(undated) (unpublished report) (prepared by Senior Economist, Financial Structure Sec-
tion, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (on file, Florida State University
Law Review).
200. Dunlap, supra note 79, at 21; L. Frieder, Interstate Banking; A Public Policy Per-
spective 2 (undated) (unpublished monograph) (on file, Florida State University Law
Review).
201. GOVERNOR'S BANKING REPORT, supra note 11, at 4-5; Florida Banking Study, supra
note 9, at 696.
202. Craddock, The Field Is Narrowing In the Banking Merger Game, FLA. TREND, Spr.
1985 (1985 Economic Yearbook), at 153 (only five Florida BHC's left in prime takeover
target category of one to three billion dollars in assets); Regional Interstate: The New
Merger Game, FLA. TREND, Oct. 1984, at 71 (banker predicting Southeast's 15 to 20 largest
statewide BHC's will combine into as few as five by 1989).
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been a policy option. 0 3 A study committee dominated by execu-
tives from large Florida BHC's in 1984 recommended against in-
cluding a trigger until there was time to "assay the results from
any period of regional reciprocal interstate banking."20 ' However,
the scholarly study undertaken for the Florida House of Repre-
sentatives that same year strongly suggested adoption of a trigger.
That study concluded that regional reciprocity with a national
trigger would deliver most of the potential benefits of each policy
option. The report was unequivocal in its ultimate conclusion:
The "trigger" to nationwide reciprocity assures that some of
the remaining geographical restrictions and any potential an-
ticompetitive effects of the eventual consolidation and concentra-
tion of state and regional markets would be addressed. The public
interest is best served when the state can achieve a more geo-
graphically diverse representation (a national presence) in the va-
rious local Florida markets. Only nationwide interstate banking
can provide this end result.20 5
A law designed to bring to Florida businesses and consumers the
full benefits of nationwide interstate banking could easily be pat-
terned after the St. Germain proposal. While "[t]he optimum 'trig-
ger' time is conjectural,"20 6 many of the reasons for having an ex-
tended phase-in period have been removed. In the Southeast, the
states that want to participate in the regional arrangement have
had time to grant reciprocity. At least since the Supreme Court
decision in June 1985, the regional BHC's have been able to plan
their expansions with certainty.2 7 A 1990 trigger date seems like a
more-than-reasonable transition period for establishment of re-
gional banks. Indeed, the regional BHC's could well become en-
trenched by then. A 1990 date would, however, conform to the St.
Germain proposal.20 8
More significantly, the public policy concerns underlying much
of the opposition to nationwide reciprocity-as opposed to the
purely protectionist impulses of local bankers-also could be ad-
dressed by state law. The issue of economic concentration is a good
203. GOVERNOR'S BANKING REPORT, supra note 11, at 6; Florida Banking Study, supra
note 9, at 760.
204. GOVERNOR'S BANKING REPORT, supra note 11, at 6.
205. Florida Banking Study, supra note 9, at 760.
206. Id.
207. Cf. id.
208. See supra text accompanying note 188.
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example. A legislature could impose a limitation on the size of any
BHC in that state, whether measured by assets or deposits, as is
contemplated in the St. Germain proposal. Chairman Volcker has
suggested fifteen percent to twenty percent as a reasonable limita-
tion for states to impose.2 9 Of course, any limitation should be
nondiscriminatory between in-state and out-of-state banking orga-
nizations.21 0 By easing entry with these safeguards, the public
could be served by an expansion in the availability of credit while
minimizing the dangers inherent in concentration.
V. CONCLUSION
About two-thirds of the states have adopted some form of inter-
state banking legislation, abrogating to some degree the geographic
limitations authorized by the Douglas Amendment. The most com-
mon form of interstate banking law is the regional reciprocal bank-
ing statute which discriminates geographically against some
BHC's. In Northeast Bancorp, the Supreme Court upheld these
laws against challenges based on the commerce, compact, and
equal protection clauses. More states may now enact regional re-
ciprocal banking laws, and BHC's where these laws are operative
may now consolidate without any legal uncertainties.
The states' efforts to restrict interstate banking ignore the reali-
ties of the marketplace, however. Bank companies and others are
establishing federally approved nonbank banks that circumvent
the restrictions on interstate banking; by doing so, these companies
have entered some of the nation's most appealing markets-like
Florida-and, by doing so, have frustrated the purpose of regional
reciprocal banking laws. With Congress unable to bring order to
the structure of the nation's financial services industry, the states
can ensure that their borrowers and savers receive the full benefits
of interstate banking by adopting trigger dates granting nationwide
reciprocal entry rights. And they can do so while offering protec-
tion against excessive concentration of resources by state, regional,
or money-center BHC's. States like Florida-populated by bur-
geoning enterprises with an insatiable appetite for capital-should
provide a time certain when full, nationwide interstate banking
will be allowed.
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